Sunday, December 29, 2013

Robert D. Knudsen's Calvinistic Philosophy lectures (Disk 17 and 18)

This is a continuation of the class lectures on Calvinistic Philosophy given by Robert D. Knudsen at Westminster Theological Seminary.  As before, the information in the audio recordings have not been validated for accuracy (use at your own risk).


Dooyeweerd Part 3 (Disk 17)

Dooyeweerd thought all along that though itself has a religious root. The way we relate to our presuppositions is through thought itself.

Dooyeweerd never considered the religiousness of thought to be the subjection of thought to metaphysically conceived axioms themselves of a scientific character standing above thought itself.

In everything manifestation of thought there is always a law order holding for it. Thought is shown to be depended upon the divine law (lex divina).

The change from the earlier to the later Dooyeweerd the change came when a critique of thought which had always been present in his thinking but the change came when he said this critique is required by the very structure of thought itself. Van Til called this the restriction and could not accept the restriction.

The reference to the religious foundation comes only in at the third step. Is this a sign that the first two steps are carried out in a neutral way? No theoretical axiom has been introduced dogmatically or any scientific prejudice, he wants to show all a long a religious impulse all along. The false starting point of apostate man causes him to introduce a prejudice.

Only from the Christian point of view is one freed to apprehend the true starting point without introducing prejudice. But this is completely religiously conditioned in either a true or false direction.

If one objects to such argumentation he must admit that he is obliged to render account of the general states of affairs or one has to present methodologically the argument for the consequences of opting against the christian position.

Dooyeweerd, part 4 (Disk 18)

Dooyeweerd's view of the soul

An outstanding characteristic of the WdW has been the critique of traditional theological views of the soul which have pretended to be scriptural. This goes for Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven (maybe Stoker, not Van Til). For Dooyeweerd it is impossible to lift your theoretical views directly out of the Bible. This includes a theoretical anthropology and it is impossible to require philosophical view to square to scripture. If we've understood the transcendental critique, any philosophical view of the soul will have a religious depth and can be judged to its scripturalness.

Dooyeweerd is certain however, that the scriptures as they address man's heart teaching him that all reality is created do not allow for dualistic philosophical notions that would draw a line or antithesis in the cosmos. Let us say between the rational soul and material body, intellect and sensibility, etc. Scripture teach that man is created and an integral being before God. So it is impossible to grasp what the soul is in contrast with created reality.

In order to gain a proper understanding of Dooyeweerd's view of the soul, this transcendental direction of this thinking must be kept in mind. There is a centripital direction of thought to the 'I' as the one who thinks. In the diversity of cosmic time there is nothing to stop this reflection, there is not thing in it for itself, there is always guidance by a theoretical idea (Law Idea) and there is always reflection upon the presuppositions of thought.

The soul, cosmic time, the various aspects, the unity of the body cannot be grasped in a theoretical concept. They appear in distinct horizons which provide a frame for our experience.

In our total beings there is this constant point back to our creator as covenant beings.

Dooyeweerd has spoken of the supra-temporality of the heart. The heart of man is not contained in within the cosmic diversity of time. If we seek to view the heart of man from within time we'll end up with nothing. This does not mean that then the heart should be sought as an entity outside of time. What it does mean is that man in his integral unity could be understood in terms of a transcendent reference interpreted by God and His revelation.

It is impossible to understand Dooyeweerd's view of the soul apart from the transcendental direction of the self and the transtemporality.

Philosophical thought is lead in the transcendental direction to reflect upon the self and philosophical thought can only point to this in the idea. In this reflection, it critically acknowledges its inability to grasp what the self is apart from God and his revelation (Calvin, Institutes I.i.1).

Now if there were a philosophical view of the soul, then the transcendental direction would have been abolished. There would be a line drawn through the creation, one part of the creation over against the other in your self reflection. In the reflection on itself it comes to reflection on its intergral root and destruction of the universality in its own sphere.

If one is to learn what the soul is he cannot lean on philosophy. He must listen to the word of God and theology has to be dependent upon revelation (as is philosophy).

In Dooyeweerd's anthropology the basic distinction was between the heart and the entire function mantle of man's body. The heart is only in its relation to the true/false concentration point. It is it point at which the various strands of life are concentrated. This concentration point is not construable in the diversity of time.

The situation is understood in terms of God's revelation which speaks to the heart of man.

Dooyeweerd says the body is an act structure in which all the aspects of the body function in an centered unity. Dooyeweerd rejects the idea of substance in the description of man.

Dooyeweerd called the development of the theroetical anthropology as the crowning point of his philosophy. He never did finish the development of this view.

Transtemporality idea

  1. The fullness of meaning is not found in anything that is temporal.
  2. In our experience there will always a tendency to dispers in a multiplicity of directions each of which if allowed to develop unrestrained would mean a fall into meaninglessness.
  3. Meaning is perserved not by following one of the dispirsed tendencies (#2) but by concentrating on the fullness of meaning.
  4. Concentrating on the fullness is by way of a reflection on oneself in ones covenant relation to God who has revealed himself in Christ.
  5. This reflection is a reflection on the self in its total involved directedness to its origin.
  6. Whether the self will stand in this fundamental covenental relationship of obedient response is a question of the true direction of the heart.

The tendency to dispurse in time is not the result of sin, but becoming bound to it is.

There is an end of the trail character to the self reflection. One may not speculate, but be content in knowing oneself in the revelation context.

Hendrik G. Stoker

Stoker for many years has been sympathetic but critically oriented representative of the Calvinistic philosophy.

Stoker has been spoken of as the first South African philosopher to have gained recognition in the US and Europe.

In 1935 he published an article in the Evangelical Quarterly (volume 7) called the possibility of a calvinistic philosophy. In the article he said there was need on a calvinistic basis for a calvinistic philosophy that is truly a philosophy. He maintained that there was too great a confusion between theology and philosophy. Furthermore, too much attention had been given to detail work without basis of building of a comprehensive system based on a reformed world and life view. There was inclusion of elements that did not belong within this framework. Stoker sought to erect a philosophy based on a calvinistic worldview.

Stokers position reflects the same spirit as Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd but it has its own cachet. Stoker remained closer to the line preceding Dooyeweerd (stands closer to Bavinck).

Three differences

  1. We find in Stoker an emphasis on principles.
  2. Stoker has never been so critical of the substance idea.
  3. He had difficultly with the idea that the cosmos is mean (he would say it has meaning).

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